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 4 
Introduction 
 
In October 2018, the Gilets Jaunes emerged as a leaderless grassroots movement 
advocating for economic justice in France. The Gilets Jaunes led approximately 60 Actes, 
marking well over a year of sustained collective action. The longevity of the Gilets 
Jaunes is unprecedented in France; two previous French social movements, the May 1968 
protests and the Nuit Debout movement, lasted only around seven weeks and three 
months respectively. The Gilets Jaunes movement is also unique due to its deliberate 
eschewing of institutional and third party support, including labor unions, political parties 
and civil society organizations. Yet another distinguishing aspect of the movement is the 
specificity of the protestors’ demands, which were published and disseminated online, in 
contrast to the comparatively vague ideological consciousness of the movement itself. 
Interestingly, the Gilets Jaunes have resisted political identification of any kind, 
repeatedly resisting attempts by the Rassemblement National, France’s far right party, to 
co-opt it.1 
One puzzle presented by these particularities is the movement’s rise in spite of its 
deliberate eschewing of institutional and third party support, given that social movements 
have traditionally benefitted from institutionalization and coalition building. How did the 
movement’s lack of such support interact with these other particularities to help or hinder 
its success?  
To answer these questions, this paper will first investigate the movement’s 
emergence and then conduct a demographical analysis of the Gilets Jaunes protestors, 
including socioeconomic status, political orientation, and reactions to mainstream 
 
1 Ketcham, Christopher. “A Play with No End: What the Gilets Jaunes Really Want.” Harper’s Magazine. 
December 12, 2019. https://harpers.org/archive/2019/08/a-play-with-no-end-gilets-jaunes/ 
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representative institutions. These factors will demonstrate the ways in which Gilets 
Jaunes members straddle conventional partisan and social identities. This paper will then 
examine the movement’s unprecedented durability through an investigation of the Gilets 
Jaunes’ characterization as “anti-system.” The goal is to understand the reasons for the 
Gilets Jaunes’ low coalition building potential with political parties and unions and how 
these factors can help explain the movement’s durability in the context of the Gilets 
Jaunes’ rejection of institutional support. Finally, this paper will reflect on the 
movement’s successes and limitations to theorize what changes in partisan identification 
foreshadow for French democracy. 
 
Emergence of the Gilets Jaunes 
The first traces of the Gilets Jaunes movement originated online in response to a 
series of policies instituted by President Emmanuel Macron during the first months of his 
presidency. These included a special tax on diesel and a reduction of the speed limit to 80 
kilometers per hour, both intended to lower France’s carbon footprint.2 However, these 
measures would disproportionately affect working class people living in rural 
communities, who had no other option but to drive to work. Not only did wealthier 
people predominantly living in cities not face similar taxes on their lifestyles, but also, 
adding insult to injury, Macron had canceled an Impot sur la Fortune, or wealth tax, six 
months before announcing the diesel tax. It was therefore widely speculated that the fuel 
taxes, introduced under the guise of environmental concern, was in fact intended to 
 
2 “Macron Recommits to Fuel Tax Amid Rising Protests.” The Wall Street Journal. November 27, 2018.  
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shrink the deficit produced by Macron’s removal of the wealth tax.3 This leads us to 
expect significant implications for how protestors might frame the gas tax as a class 
issue, an assumption that proves correct. 
A multitude of petitions were created and circulated in the months after this series 
of legislative decisions. One prominent effort was that of Priscillia Ludosky, a self-
employed cosmetics businesswoman from Parisian suburb Seine-en-Marne, who in May 
2018 posted a petition on the change.org website entitled “Pour une Baisse des Prix du 
Carburant à la Pompe!” or “For a drop in the fuel prices at the pump!”4 The petition 
gained little traction; by October, it had only accumulated around 1,000 signatures. In 
October, Éric Drouet, a French truck driver from the same Parisian suburb, contacted 
Ludosky to help promote the petition. Around the same time, a local newspaper covered 
Ludosky’s appearance on a radio show; as a result, the article about her petition was 
shared to a Seine-et-Marne Facebook page with around 50,000 subscribers. Importantly, 
petrol prices had been continuously rising due to a global spike in oil prices. Following 
this combination of factors Ludosky’s petition went viral, accumulating over 200,000 
signatures. By early December, it had collected over 1.2 million.5 
In an effort distinct from Ludosky’s and other online petitions that had been 
gaining momentum, Drouet and another truck driver, also from Seine-en-Marne, created 
 
3 Kim Willsher. “Macron Scraps Fuel Tax Rise in Face of Gilets Jaunes Protests.” The Guardian. December 
5, 2018.  
4 “Priscillia Ludosky, L’auteure de la Pétition sur les Prix du Carburant Répond à Emmanuel Macron.” 
Europe1. December 26, 2018. 
5 Rubin, Alissa J. “France’s Yellow Vest Protests: The Movement That Has Put Paris on Edge.” The New 
York Times. December 3, 2018.  
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a Facebook event called “National Blockage Against Rising Fuel,” scheduled for 
November 17.6  
Beginning with the first demonstration on November 17, the Gilets Jaunes’ two 
main forms of protest include the occupation of public spaces, especially on heavily 
trafficked roundabouts, and weekly marches, or ‘Acts,’ held on weekends, usually 
Saturdays, throughout France.7 The protests quickly transcended the original fuel tax 
focus, exploding into a movement against widening inequality, stagnant economic 
growth, and a fundamental sense of social crisis, all of which have been felt by 
vulnerable, predominantly rural communities, for whom the fuel tax was the final straw.8  
A February 2019 survey showed that protestors said they were demonstrating to 
oppose the political elites (50%); to share the country’s wealth (44%); to fight against 
unjust fiscal measures (44%); to move away from the policies in place over decades 
(34%); to improve the way democracy works (25%); and to demand dignity and 
recognition (19%)9. The protestors had strong support from the public, with opinion polls 
indicating support at over 70% in early December 2018 and over 50% by late March 
2019.10  
In short, what began as a fuel protest evolved into a broader, all-encompassing 
anti-government movement. This phenomenon is unsurprising, according to scholars 
such as professor of history at New York University Herrick Chapman, who posits that 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, established by Charles de Gaulle in 1958, 
 
6 Moullot, Pauline. “Hausse du Prix de l’essence: Qui est à l’origine.du Mouvement du 17 Novembre?” 
Libération. October 26, 2018.  
7 Frédéric Royall, “The Gilets Jaunes Protests: Mobilisation Without Third-Party Support,” Modern & 
Contemporary France, DOI: 10.1080/09639489.2019.1676217 
8 Christopher Caldwell. “The People’s Emergency.” The New Republic. April 22, 2019.  
9 Royall, “Mobilisation Without Third-Party Support.” 
10 Bernard Sananes, Laurence Bedeau, Thomas Vitiello. “Les ‘Gilets Jaunes’: La Partie Emergée de la 
Crise Sociale Française?” Institut Montaigne. 2019.  
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centralized power in the Presidential palace to such an extreme extent – even designing 
the National Assembly to operate as subordinate – that it kickstarted a cyclical effect by 
which extra institutional action, such as street protests and social movements, became the 
only alternative to policy.11 The Fifth Republic’s overcentralized authority has been 
funneling French citizens into the streets, as seen through the protests of May 1968, Nuit 
Debout, and now the Gilets Jaunes, since its inception. While the emergence of the Gilets 
Jaunes aligns with theories of French political cycles, the movement’s durability and 
eschewal of third party support are unprecedented and therefore require further analysis 
to understand current cycles of French political change.  
 
Who are the Gilets Jaunes: Economic, Political and Social Characteristics of Gilet Jaune 
Participants 
Due to the decentralized and evolving nature of social movements, data pertaining 
to the demographics of the Gilets Jaunes movement are not exact. However, a group of 
sociologists, political scientists and geographers published a study of the motivations and 
socio-demographic profiles of the movement based on an analysis of 166 questionnaires 
distributed to participants at roundabouts and vehicle tollbooths as well as during the 
demonstrations of November 24 and December 1.12  These data reveal a variety of 
economic, political and cultural factors that mobilized a population in favor of a degree 
of political change that they no longer trust the political system and elite to achieve for 
them. 
 
 
11 Adam Gopnik. “The Yellow Vests and Why There Are So Many Street Protests in France.” The New 
Yorker, 6 Dec. 2018. 
12 “Gilets Jaunes: A Pioneering Study of the ‘Low Earners’ Revolt.” Verso Books. December 14, 2018.  
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Age 
The researchers found that the average protestor was 45 years old, slightly older 
than the average age of the French population (41.4 years). 27% of participants were 35-
49 years old and 26% were 50-64 years old. By comparison, 6% were 18-24, while 
17.3% was over 65.   
These data are unsurprising because this age category has, on average, been 
edging closer to poverty, experiencing an economic position of insecurity, or “la précarité 
économique.” Furthermore, they make up an influential voting bloc: France’s 15 million 
pensioners vote at a higher rate than other age groups.13 However, while three out of four 
pensioners voted for Macron in the second round of the 2017 presidential election, a 
March 2018 survey conducted by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique indicated that 
pensioners’ support for Macron had fallen to 53%.14 This is significant, indicating a 
partisan identification shift. This shift demands a response from political parties if they 
want to retain their most vital source of power – popular support.  
During his campaign, Macron had pledged to increase the general social 
contribution (CSG) tax, whose revenues are allocated to the social security budget, 
including pension schemes and insurance. However, many pensioners claimed they had 
actually been hurt by Macron’s other tax measures, such as the diesel tax and social 
welfare reductions. The government had estimated that, as a result of the tax changes, 20-
 
13 Ingrid Melander, “French Pensioners Tell Macron to Stop Squeezing Their Finances,” Reuters, March 
15, 2018.  
14 Melander, “French Pensioners,” 2018.  
 10 
25% of pensioners would experience a deficit of a few dozen euros, while the wealthiest 
pensioners could see their spending power fall by several hundred euros per year.15  
Labor force participation at older ages in France has been found to have a strong 
relationship with reforms of retirement and preretirement policy.16 This is supported by 
the case of the Gilets Jaunes, in which widespread mobilization of pensioners follows a 
fifteen-year reversal of older workers’ labor force participation and employment rates.17 
While changes in health, life expectancy and education levels have remained more or less 
consistent, pension reforms and associated changes in monetary incentives have been 
identified as the factors prompting individuals to work longer with increasingly 
precarious economic stability. This demographic is relatively unusual for the usual 
French contentious politics.  
This older demographic as core part of the Gilets Jaunes movement contrasts with 
past movements, including Nuit Debout and May 1968, both initiated by students. 
Arguably, the Gilets Jaunes movement represents a later phase of Nuit Debout: the 
abstract disillusionment of the younger, urban Nuit Debout protestors was concretized 
into a wide-ranging list of specific demands by the Gilets Jaunes.  
 
Socioeconomic Class 
 
The unusual age demographic of the Gilets Jaunes links tightly with the 
socioeconomic class demographics of the movement because the makeup of the Gilets 
 
15 Melander, “French Pensioners,” 2018. 
16 Didier Blanchet, Louis-Paul Pele. “Social Security and Retirement in France,” University of Chicago 
Press (April 1999).  
17 Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, Simon Rabaté, Muriel Roger. “Workers’ Employment Rates and 
Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Implicit Labor Taxation,” The National Bureau of Economic 
Research, no. 25733 (April 2019). 
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Jaunes shows that what is new about the Gilets Jaunes is its linkage to the qualms of 
rural, older French citizens, unlike past movements, which typically represented a 
mobilization of the young, urban French.  
The average Gilet Jaune is a member of the working or lower middle class. The 
study found a high presence of employees and poor representation of middle-level 
professionals and managers. Employees made up 33% of the participants (45% of those 
of working age), compared to 27% for France as a whole, while middle-level 
professionals made up 10% of participants (13% of those of working age), compared to 
26% for France as a whole. Managers comprised around 5% of participants (7% of those 
of working age), compared to 18% of France as a whole.18  
55% of respondents said they paid income tax (a percentage comparable to that of 
the general population) and 85% said they owned a car. Researchers reported that the 
median declared household income was 1,700 euros per month, around 30% less than the 
median for all French households.19 If this sample can be assumed to be representative of 
the broader Gilets Jaunes population, this indicates that the majority of participants are in 
a precarious financial situation, but not the most economically vulnerable: 10% of 
respondents declared an income below 800 euros per month, higher than 519 euros per 
month for the corresponding poorest 10% of French households.20 
One limitation of this study is that it did not examine unemployment as a distinct 
criterion. However, a comparison of unemployment rates between urban and rural areas 
in France as a whole presents a puzzle for my research question because we would expect 
that the regions with higher unemployment would be driving the movement focused on 
 
18 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.  
19 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
20 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
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economic justice. However, not only is the unemployment rate in France actually higher 
in urban areas (10% in urban areas compared to 6% in rural areas in 2017)21 but both 
rates have been decreasing since their record high in 2015 (11% and 6% respectively).22 
Paradoxically, those from rural areas have mobilized to a far greater extent than those 
living in urban areas. 
This can be explained by several economic and social factors. First of all, rural 
areas have been struggling for decades due to globalization, which has caused 
disproportionate levels of delocalization, out-migration and unemployment in rural 
regions. The devastating effects of globalization were accelerated by the 2008 financial 
crisis, from which these populations were unable to recover. Between 2010 and 2013 
alone, French companies relocating abroad cost the country 20,000 jobs.23 Furthermore, 
202,000 full-time equivalent jobs had already been lost in the auto sector during the years 
2004-2007, which then experienced a fall of 8% in 2008. Since then, French automakers 
have begun producing the majority of their cars outside of France, reserving few, top of 
the line vehicles for French plants.24 In that same time period, industrial jobs in France as 
a whole fell from 5.5 million to 3.5 million, with the most heavily affected sectors being 
real estate and construction. Thus, while unemployment rates may have been higher in 
urban areas, those areas were also more economically resilient, being better positioned to 
attract budding industries. In rural areas, by contrast, a closed factory left a huge wave of 
unemployment in its wake, leaving workers in neighboring towns no choice but to seek 
temporary labor, to make do with government aid, or to move. Demographer Hervé Le 
 
21 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
22 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
23 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
24 Carlos Maravall-Rodriguez and Anna Chiara Küffel. “A Comparative View of Motor Vehicle Production 
in France.” European Commission. December 2018.  
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Bras observed that the map of Gilets Jaunes mobilization matches the map of French 
regions that are losing population.25 
This phenomenon appears to be in line with relative deprivation theories, which 
posit that people who feel unfairly deprived of resources will join social movements in 
order to acquire the resources that other members possess.26 The Gilets Jaunes’ 
socioeconomic grievances have contributed to the movement’s durability through the 
sense of solidarity protestors found within the movement once they joined. Members of a 
lower socioeconomic status often find it more difficult to find socializing opportunities, 
between having to work longer hours and not having the extra money necessary to 
finance a night out. I will argue below that this is a reason for durability. 
A vast array of interviews published in news publications and independent 
documentaries reveal that many protestors saw social rewards in joining the movement. 
The documentary “J’veux du Soleil!” featured commentary by numerous protestors who 
shared their experiences of not being able to afford going out: “However little it would 
cost us, we wouldn’t be able to afford it,” said one of the protestors interviewed at a rond-
point. “We didn’t exist and suddenly we found each other. There’s fraternity. The friends 
I have now I hadn’t had like that in ten years,” said another protestor. Other comments 
included, “We’ve formed such strong social bonds. I’ve cried more than once” and 
“We’re doing something crazy, together. It’s wonderful… we’re one big family here.” 
One protestor commented, “People are very scared of their neighbors. There’s no 
solidarity. That’s something to restore.” This analysis of a transition from isolation to 
solidarity is in clear alignment with breakdown theory, which posits that actors who are 
 
25 “Hervé Le Bras a Dessiné La Carte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Youtube, 7 Dec. 2018. 
26 Korpi, Walter. "Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation." The American Political Science Review 68, 
no. 4 (1974): 1569-578. doi:10.2307/1959942. 
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weakly integrated into their community and experience social discontent are more likely 
to join a protest movement.27 According to breakdown theorist Anthony Oberschall 
(1978), “Breakdown theory points to the dissolution of traditional social formations and 
communal solidarities as a result of rapid social change. Social disorganization, 
demographic pressures, and ecological imbalance lead to the accumulation of strains, 
frustrations, insecurity, and grievances, and the resulting pressure cooker has a tendency 
to explode in collective violence and civil disorder.”28 
The Gilets Jaunes movement, rather than supplementing other socializing 
opportunities, offered a sense of community and social connection of which many of the 
protestors had felt otherwise deprived. These social rewards have helped to sustain 
collective action within the movement. 
The case of the Gilets Jaunes presents a challenge to solidarity theorists, who, in 
opposition to breakdown theorists, argue that isolated individuals are less likely to protest 
than others because protest is reliant on social cohesion. They argue that solidarity is 
necessary to produce bloc mobilization, by which movements can expand by enlisting 
entire blocs of organized people instead of recruiting individuals one by one. The case of 
Gilets Jaunes, however, shows that social breakdown and discontent can motivate people 
to create solidarity and mobilizing structures even without preexisting social cohesion, as 
displayed by the success of rond-point demonstrations.  
Overall, the sense of community found within the movement greatly aided its 
momentum, particularly because many of those who joined had felt previously isolated, 
as interviews have revealed. I theorize that this social isolation, combined with a sense of 
 
27 Useem, Bert. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement." American 
Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 357-69.  
28 Useem. "Solidarity Model." American Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 357-69. 
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economic suffering and political invisibility, heightened the sense solidarity found within 
the movement. It can be surmised that this is a broader phenomenon for the Gilets Jaunes 
because of the prevalence of these social and economic conditions among participants. 
These factors’ impact was compounded by the movement’s lack of third 
party/institutional support, which contributed to an additional bond of shared alienation.  
 
Educational Qualifications 
Researchers found that 20% of respondents had a university-level degree (versus 
27% of the general French population), 35% of participants had obtained vocational high 
school degrees (versus 24% in the general population) and 29% had obtained general 
baccalaureate degrees (compared with 16% of the general population).29 Additional 
findings from the December 8 demonstration, which saw more additional respondents 
with master’s degrees, led the researchers to conclude that the population of participants 
had comparable educational qualifications to the general French population. 
These findings underscore the fact that the Gilets Jaunes represent a mobilization 
not of those at the very bottom, but of those who have found themselves inching closer to 
the brink of poverty. In addition, it is likely that more of the people who are unemployed 
in rural areas are older than those who are unemployed in urban areas, due to rising 
trends of delocalization and globalization, which have driven the bulk of employment 
opportunities to urban areas. This represents further confirmation of relative deprivation: 
people who feel unfairly deprived of resources are joining the Gilets Jaunes to acquire the 
resources that others possess. 
 
 
29 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
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Motivations for Joining 
 In response to the question “Why are you demonstrating today?” more than half 
of the respondents cited “inadequate purchasing power,” such as not being able to afford 
small luxuries, struggling to feed their children and moving in with family or friends due 
to housing being no longer affordable. The second most popular response, from over 40% 
of respondents, was “excessive tax burden.” Many specifically listed high fuel prices. 
Approximately 20% said they were demonstrating to protest against the government and 
to demand Macron’s resignation. 10% of respondents wanted institutional reforms, a 
sentiment that had strengthened among participants in the December 8 demonstrations.30  
  
Objectives of the Gilets Jaunes: Les Revendications Officielles  
As part of the survey, the researchers asked participants what the government 
should do to address the Gilets Jaunes’ demands. Given that the majority of respondents 
focused on economic goals rather than institutional reforms, one might surmise that they 
could be willing to work with parties if they felt that were the only way to make progress. 
This indicates the importance of the parties’ response to the Gilets Jaunes’ platform and 
is supported by the evidence below. 
One third of respondents said implement tax cuts and another third said institute 
measures to increase purchasing power. Among these, 16% wanted an increase in the 
minimum wage or wages in general, 8% wanted a general increase in purchasing power 
and 4% wanted an increase in pensions. Over a fifth of respondents wanted wealth 
redistribution. Among these, 11% wanted the reinstatement of the wealth tax and 3% 
 
30 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
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wanted a fairer distribution of taxes.31 Over a fifth of respondents wanted the government 
to show more compassion and understanding toward citizens. In regards to institutional 
demands, 16% said significant institutional reforms were vital in order to deem the 
movement a success: 11% demanded fundamental changes, including a total reform of 
the state or a different political system, 5% wanted to end “the privileges of 
parliamentarians” and 2% said they believed in the necessity of a Sixth Republic.32 
 Unlike past French movements such as Nuit Debout, which concerned abstract 
political and philosophical questions, the Gilets Jaunes presented concrete, bread-and-
butter demands. The “Charte Officielle des Gilets Jaunes,” or Official Chart of the Gilets 
Jaunes, was first posted to a Facebook group of the same name on December 5, 2018, 
where it was widely circulated.33 The chart, followed by the list of demands translated 
into English, are included on the next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
32 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
33 “Charte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Facebook, www.facebook.com/Charte-des-gilets-jaunes-756772671347085/. 
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Gilets Jaunes' List of Demands34  
 
Economy/Work 
• A constitutional cap on taxes - at 25% 
• Increase of 40% in the basic pension and social welfare 
• Increase hiring in public sector to re-establish public services 
• Massive construction projects to house 5 million homeless, and severe penalties 
for mayors/prefectures that leave people on the streets 
• Break up the 'too-big-to-fail' banks, re-separate regular banking from investment 
banking 
• Cancel debts accrued through usurious rates of interest 
Politics 
• Constitutional amendments to protect the people's interests, including binding 
referenda 
• The barring of lobby groups and vested interests from political decision-making 
• Frexit: Leave the EU to regain our economic, monetary and political sovereignty 
(In other words, respect the 2005 referendum result, when France voted against 
the EU Constitution Treaty, which was then renamed the Lisbon Treaty) 
• Clampdown on tax evasion by the ultra-rich 
• The immediate cessation of privatization, and the re-nationalization of public 
goods like motorways, airports, rail, etc. 
• Remove all ideology from the ministry of education, ending all destructive 
education techniques 
• Quadruple the budget for law and order and put time limits on judicial procedures. 
Make access to the justice system available for all 
• Break up media monopolies and end their interference in politics. Make media 
accessible to citizens and guarantee a plurality of opinions. End editorial 
propaganda 
• Guarantee citizens' liberty by including in the constitution a complete prohibition 
on state interference in their decisions concerning education, health and family 
matters 
Health/Environment 
• No more 'planned obsolescence' - Mandate guarantee from producers that their 
products will last 10 years, and that spare parts will be available during that 
period 
• Ban plastic bottles and other polluting packaging 
• Weaken the influence of big pharma on health in general and hospitals in 
particular 
• Ban on GMO crops, carcinogenic pesticides, endocrine disruptors and monocrops 
• Reindustrialize France (thereby reducing imports and thus pollution) 
 
34 “Charte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Facebook, www.facebook.com/Charte-des-gilets-jaunes-756772671347085/. 
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Foreign Affairs 
• End France's participation in foreign wars of aggression, and exit from NATO 
• Cease pillaging and interfering - politically and militarily - in 'Francafrique', 
which keeps Africa poor. Immediately repatriate all French soldiers. Establish 
relations with African states on an equal peer-to-peer basis 
• Prevent migratory flows that cannot be accommodated or integrated, given the 
profound civilizational crisis we are experiencing 
• Scrupulously respect international law and the treaties we have signed 
 
A Dual Analysis of the Gilets Jaunes as an Anti-System Movement 
Theoretical definitions of “anti-system” political groups shed light on the durability 
of the Gilets Jaunes despite their consistent resistance to institutionalization. According to 
Florentine political analyst Giovanni Sartori, “An anti-system opposition abides by a 
belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates. 
According to the strict definition, then, anti-system parties represent an extraneous 
ideology – thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological difference 
(Sartori, 1976). Capoccia elaborates on this analysis, arguing that “Sartori’s concept of 
the anti-system party is thus ‘relational’ in a twofold sense: first, it involves the 
ideological distance of a party from the others along the political (left-right) space of 
electoral competition; second, it refers to the delegitimizing impact of the party’s actions 
and propaganda on the regime in which it operates.”35  
 
 
 
 
 
35 Capoccia, Giovanni. “Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 
14, no. 1 (2002): 9-13.  
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                    36 
 
 
 
The Gilets Jaunes embody multiple elements of anti-politics party represented in 
the table above: (a) their demands illustrate their spatial distance from the mainstream 
political spectrum because their demands align with an array of party ideologies across 
the political spectrum, revealing a main reason why the Gilets Jaunes feel unrepresented: 
there is no established political party that represents all of their interests (b) there has 
been low potential for coalition building with political parties and labor unions, and (c) 
the government and media responses to the movement have sought to delegitimize it 
through accusations of anti-Semitism and homophobia.37 The next sections will expand 
on points (a) and (b) to understand how aspects of these anti-system characteristics can be 
used to understand the movement’s durability and future.  
 
 
 
 
36 Capoccia, “Anti-System Parties.” 2002. 
37 Lucy Williamson. “Gilets Jaunes: How Much Anti-Semitism is Beneath the Yellow Vests?” BBC News. 
February 19, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47286576 
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Distant Spatial Location: the Gilets Jaunes’ Nonpartisan Demands and Challenge to 
Political Parties 
The Gilets Jaunes’ wide-ranging demands are key to understanding the 
movement’s resistance to institutional and third party support. These demands, as 
aforementioned, align with an array of party ideologies across the political spectrum and 
therefore reveal a main reason why the Gilets Jaunes feel unrepresented: there is no 
established political party that represents all of their interests. For example, left parties 
such as La France Insoumise espouse pension and minimum wage increases, while the 
demand to crack down on migratory flows is aligned with parties of the right, such as the 
Rassemblement National. No mainstream political party in France, meanwhile, calls for 
demands such as amending the constitution. The Gilets Jaunes’ demands to amend the 
constitution, consistent with protestors in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, may seem at odds with 
the institutional distrust that defines their movement. However, amending the constitution 
would represent reclamation of the state by those who feel powerless; many protestors 
envision a constitution of the people that would restore their trust in government because 
they would have greater agency to shape it. Aside from institutional distrust, the spatial 
distance between Gilets Jaunes interests and current party platforms is sufficient to 
explain their extra institutional action. With over five main political parties in France, not 
one political platform aligns with the majority of the Gilets Jaunes’ political and 
economic demands. This reflects the growing political phenomenon that political parties 
have gradually abandoned the working class.  
The increasing misalignment between mainstream party platforms and the 
interests of the working class has been acknowledged as a growing trend in Western 
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democracies. Patrick Liddiard, a political analyst at the Wilson Center, posits that 
structural economic changes in advanced industrial democracies have decreased voters’ 
demand for traditional political parties of the traditional center-left and center-right 
orientations, while deindustrialization has reduced the working class, giving the political 
left less of an incentive to cater to this demographic.38 Further, political scientists Russel 
Dalton and Michael Wattenberg argue that deindustrialization, which has produced a 
more educated population, means these increasingly informed electorates are less 
dependent on information from traditional political parties to form their individual 
political opinions. Consequentially, voters become less attached to party labels and elites 
and increasingly engaged in alternative forms of political mobilization.39 
In France, there is ample evidence of weakened partisan attachment. According to 
researchers Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, “flash” political parties indicate 
weak political involvement and partisan commitments: “such phenomena are hardly 
signals of long-term public involvement in politics but betray instead a normal weak 
involvement. The durably involved voter tends toward strong partisan commitments and 
his behavior over time stabilizes party fortunes within a nation.”40 Macron’s “La 
Republique En Marche” is one such example of a flash political party whose short-lived 
success, contrary to Macron’s language of strengthened unity, reveals the current culture 
of French citizens’ weak partisan commitments.  
 
38 Patrick Liddiard, “The Trouble with Political Parties and the Rise of the Yellow Vests.” The Wilson 
Center. March 5, 2019. 
39 Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Unthinkable Democracy: Political Change in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies,” p. 11 in Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
40 Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux. “Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United 
States.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1, 1962, pp. 1–23. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2747075.  
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The chart above41 illustrates the correlation between voter turnout and party 
system volatility as indicated by changes in existing parties’ vote shares, parties’ vote 
share between elections, and new/defunct parties’ vote shares. As turnout has decreased, 
partisan attachment has also decreased, indicating a loss of legitimacy in mainstream 
political parties.  
Focusing back on the ideological and political spatial distance between the Gilets 
Jaunes and mainstream political parties, this phenomenon is particularly visible in a 
popular Gilet Jaune Facebook group called “Gilet Jaune,” which contains 25,480 
members at the time of writing. The chart below offers further insight into the issues that 
 
41 Patrick Liddiard, “The Trouble with Political Parties and the Rise of the Yellow Vests.” The Wilson 
Center. March 5, 2019. 
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December 2018 (blue) vs. December 2019 (red)
active members care about by comparing the number of mentions per topic (loosely 
corresponding to the aforementioned list of official demands) in December of 2018 
versus December 2019.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues like “travail,” “constitution,” “liberté,” “media,” and “pollution” all 
appeared around 40-50 times in 2018. This chart illustrates the Gilets Jaunes’ ideological 
and political spatial distance from mainstream political parties because stances of this 
high frequency fall across the political spectrum, underscoring that no party represents 
their demands.  
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Their demands lie outside of traditional left-right spectrum, a spectrum that they 
challenge through their emphasis on nonpartisan rhetoric and identification, as well as 
their voting rates. This is demonstrated by the fact that Gilets Jaunes emphatically 
identify as unattached to the language of left-right party politics. Even when organizing 
for political office, they described their roster of candidates as “nonpartisan and 
independent,” a) dissociating from the political party structure and b) casting themselves 
as a challenge to it.42 While there is not currently sufficient data of party membership 
among the Gilets Jaunes, a poll showed that in the 2017 presidential election many in the 
movement voted for candidates on the far left or the far right; however, many also did not 
vote at all.43  
Furthermore, in the aforementioned analysis of 166 questionnaires distributed to 
Gilets Jaunes protestors, 33% of respondents identified as apolitical, or “neither right nor 
left” (versus 22% of France as a whole).44 Among those who did identify their position, 
15% placed themselves on the far left, 42% were on the left, 12% were on the right and 
5% were on the far right (compared to 32% on the left and 39% on the right in France as 
a whole). Only 6% of respondents ranked themselves in the political center. One 
takeaway is that based on their wide range of political identification it is clear that 
political orientation and party affiliation represent weaker ties for this group than their 
specific, collective demands. Another takeaway is that, interestingly, despite the wide 
range of partisan identification, this data suggests that Gilets Jaunes participants are more 
likely to be on the Left. According to analyst Laurent Bouvet, a member of the leftwing 
 
42 James McAuley. “Do France’s ‘Yellow Vests’ Have a Future as a Political Party? Some Hope so.” The 
Washington Post. WP Company, 26 Jan. 2019. 
43 Michel Rose and Luke Baker. “No Leader, Lots of Anger: Can France’s ‘Yellow Vests’ Become a 
Political Force?” Reuters, 6 Dec. 2018. 
44 “Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018. 
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thinktank the Jean Jaurès Foundation, which advises the Socialist party, there is ample 
evidence that the French working class has been abandoned by the left through the focus 
on problems of minority groups instead of French society more broadly, which 
exacerbates working-class concerns about immigration and resulting cultural changes. In 
an interview with The Observer, Bouvet said “the economic crisis, unemployment, social 
problems, globalization make people afraid, but if it was just about economics we would 
see these people vote for the radical left, which they are not.”45  
In conclusion, the Gilets Jaunes’ ideological and political spatial distance from 
mainstream political parties can be explained by a perceived abandonment by the left and 
the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream political 
parties. While protestors mostly identify with the left, they do not trust existing 
institutions. 
In other words, the specificity of the protestors’ political and economic demands 
shows that they are unified in their sense of invisibility and economic exclusion. 
However, the fact that they are comparatively divided in political orientation explains the 
ideological vagueness of the movement and indicates the challenge that the Gilets Jaunes’ 
mobilization poses to the political party system. There is ample research leading scholars 
to argue that the population no longer maps clearly onto dominant party positions. 
According to Gérard Grunberg, a researcher at the Center for European Studies at 
Sciences Po, the political cleavages separating mainstream parties, such as the economy, 
are no longer the issues that drive popular political debate. “On immigration, Europe, 
 
45 Kim Willsher. “‘Abandoned’ French Working Class Ready to Punish Left’s Neglect by Voting for Far 
Right.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 21 Mar. 2015. 
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globalization, the big divide now is whether you want an open or closed country.”46 
Pierre Rosanvallon, a professor at the Collège de France, makes the argument that 
“Voters have moved from a representation system to an identification system. In the old 
system, parties had identifiable social bases and their job was to represent that base, to 
aggregate their interests … Now we are in a process of identification … The new leaders 
are presenting themselves like concepts and voters are asked to adhere to that.”47 This 
line of reasoning applies to both Macron’s party and the National Front, which are based 
on the personality of Macron and Marine Le Pen rather than appealing to specific voter 
bases. Political scientist Pierre Cayrol argues that the obsolescence of the French two-
party system does not automatically affect the concept of the left-right spectrum; the 
difference, instead, will be that the differences are based on sentimental identification 
rather than policy differences. Social issues will be left as the sole distinction between the 
left and the right.48 The Gilets Jaunes exemplify this separation of policy demands from 
political orientation: they represent an apartisan embrace of an expanded social safety 
net, instruments of direct democracy and class solidarity. 
Furthermore, in this context of rising political distrust, underscored by rising levels of 
abstention and of the tendency to vote “against” rather than “for” a candidate (Macron’s 
2017 victory was due to his outsider status and rejection of his far-right opponent, rather 
than an embrace of his free market and pro-European platform)49, a system in which 
people can act as their own representatives such as direct democracy becomes more 
appealing.  
 
46 Pierre Briançon. “France’s Two Big Parties Face Long-Term Decline. POLITICO, 21 Apr. 2017. 
47 Pierre Briançon. “France’s Two Big Parties Face Long-Term Decline. POLITICO, 21 Apr. 2017. 
48 Pierre Briançon. “France’s Two Big Parties Face Long-Term Decline. POLITICO, 21 Apr. 2017. 
49 Chamorel, Patrick. “Macron Versus the Yellow Vests.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 48-62.  
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The Low Coalition Building Potential of the Gilets Jaunes 
Another reason for the movement’s resistance to institutionalization is that many 
protestors were already distrustful of mainstream institutions: Gilets Jaunes participants 
largely eschew institutional and third party support, with the majority holding that trade 
unions (64%) and political parties (81%) had no place in the movement.  
The Gilets Jaunes’ distrust of mainstream institutions, their diversity of political 
orientation and the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream 
political parties offer a compelling explanation of characterizations of the Gilets Jaunes 
as “anti-system.” However, while the protestors’ distrust, diversity of political orientation 
and the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream political 
parties explain the low coalition building potential between the Gilets Jaunes and political 
parties, these factors but do not account for coalition building potential with labor unions, 
of which the Gilets Jaunes have also been dismissive.  
Articles indicate that French unions have adopted varied and evolving stances 
toward the Gilets Jaunes movement. On December 6, 2018, a few weeks after the initial 
demonstration, leaders of the union confederations came together to decide on an official 
position regarding the uprisings. The CFDT, CGT, FO, CFE-CGC, Unsa and the FSU 
released a collective declaration calling for the government to “finally commit to genuine 
negotiations” regarding “spending power, salaries, transport, housing, the presence and 
accessibility of public services, and the tax system,”50 affirming Gilets Jaunes demands. 
However, as part of this declaration, the union confederations denounced all forms of 
violence in by protestors expressing these demands.  
 
50 Joe Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions: A Convergence Over What?” Notes From Below, 
December 18, 2018. 
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Several unions have shown tentative signs of support for the Gilets Jaunes in 
acknowledgement of their many shared positions, which include a reinstating of the 
wealth tax and canceling the increase to retirees’ taxes. The CGT marched during the 
Acte III demonstration in Paris alongside trade unionists, though separate from the Gilets 
Jaunes.51 Attac, a union that advocates for reforms to the financial system and greater 
regulation of markets, were distributing pamphlets at Acte III. “I didn’t hear of them 
being thrown aside,” said Annick Coupé, secretary general of Attac.52  
Several factors help to explain the Gilets Jaunes’ resistance to unions despite 
occupying shared positions. First of all, unions have experienced a gradual loss of power 
in recent years; interestingly, the emergence of alternative forms of political mobilization 
in France has correlated with this gradual decline of unions. In his first 10 months in 
office, Macron softened France’s strict labor laws in an act of hostility toward unions.53 
However, signs of weakening French unions have existed for decades: union membership 
has fallen dramatically since 1968.54 Consequently, strikes have become less effective 
and therefore less frequent. As a result, over time, political parties and labor unions have 
gradually lost the monopoly they once enjoyed over the French political infrastructure. 
Therefore, despite an overlap in policy goals, the Gilets Jaunes do not see unions as a 
reliable route through which they could mobilize effectively. This indicates that the 
reason that the Gilets Jaunes do not work with unions is less an issue of distrust and more 
logistical concerns that they see unions as inefficient and less influential than before. “We 
might remember that classic union movements have not been able, over the last few 
 
51 Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions,” Notes From Below, December 18, 2018. 
52 Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions,” Notes From Below, December 18, 2018. 
53 Michel Rose, “French Mood Far From Revolutionary Despite Lingering May ’68 Spirit,” Reuters, April 
13, 2018.  
54 Rose, “French Mood,” 2018.  
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years, to make any social advances. One consequence that is that anger that was muted, 
it’s being heard today,” said confederal secretary of the CGT Fabrice Angéï.55 Éric 
Beynel, spokesperson for Solidaires, echoed this sentiment: “The unions haven’t 
successfully built the necessary mobilisations to struggle against social injustices. On the 
labour law, we would have had to blockade the economy through strikes, but we didn’t 
manage to do it.” 
The demographics of the Gilets Jaunes reveal another reason for a disconnect 
between unions and Gilets Jaunes protestors: the huge majority of Gilets Jaunes are 
either inactifs (unemployed or retired; 25.5%), employés (service sector workers; 33.3%), 
ouvriers (industrial workers; 14.4%), or in professions intermédiaires (nurses, primary-
school teachers; 5.2%); in other words, this movement is largely comprised of a 
population that lives off wages and social security instead of profits or rent. 
The unions have therefore been challenged by how to work with a population that 
they do not represent. “Amongst the gilets jaunes, there are so many retirees, so many 
precarious people, unemployed people. Our terrain is, before anywhere else, the world of 
work. It’s a question which we’re posed with, the unions, how to reach out to these 
categories too,” said Angéï.56 This is an important aspect of why Gilets Jaunes and unions 
do not cooperate: unions look out for their own workers and the Gilets Jaunes are not 
likely to be employed in union jobs, or even at all.  
On the part of the Gilets Jaunes, there are logistical reasons that working with 
unions can be difficult. In an interview, Serge, a Gilet Jaune and former customer service 
employee, gave one explanation: “It gets stuck at the level of the demonstrations. When 
 
55 Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions,” Notes From Below, December 18, 2018. 
56 Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions,” Notes From Below, December 18, 2018. 
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the unions demonstrate, they respect the route defined with the prefecture, while the 
yellow vests think that if the police say something, the opposite must be done.”  
Another Gilet Jaune, whose name was changed for security, said: “I went to ask 
[the union] for information about my work, I really do not earn enough to get by. I 
wanted to know if there was an enforceable law to make a living from work. And since 
they had no answer, I joined the yellow vests. There, I realized that it was the same for 
everyone; workers are poor, people who do not work are poor; even those who work 
overtime can't do it, they are taxed so much. So I joined this movement really out of 
conviction and I will continue to the end, despite the repression.”57 
 Another Gilet Jaune gave their perspective on the movement’s relationship with 
unions: “We are in contact with the CGT, and with Lutte Ouvrière. We went to parade 
with them. At the outset, they did not want us to speak. And then there lately, they let us 
speak with them. Some unions didn't like it, but too bad! We do not know the laws well 
and they can help us! We build, we build! … We don't want to be a union or a political 
party. We really want to stay in a movement, to achieve a new way of ruling the 
country.” 
These interviews reveal the logistical and ideological differences between unions 
and Gilets Jaunes that have made it difficult for the two groups to cooperate, while the 
unions’ loss of power indicate lessened incentive for the Gilets Jaunes to work with 
unions in the first place.  
 
 
 
57 Stathis Kouvélakis and Pascale Arnaud. “Paroles De Rond-Point. Entretiens Avec Les Gilets Jaunes De 
Troyes.” CONTRETEMPS, 15 Apr. 2019. 
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Strengths, Limitations and Implications of the Gilets Jaunes 
Having examined the demographics of the movement coupled with an 
examination of its anti-system positionality, one broader question remains: what are the 
implications of the Gilets Jaunes movement for French democracy? 
In the face of institutional mistreatment, there are two options: scapegoating other 
populations and holding the system accountable. While disillusioned Americans turned to 
Donald Trump to resolve their existential woes, the Gilets Jaunes steadfastly chose the 
route of political and economic system accountability and reform. Their early success 
was impressive: two months after the demonstrations began, Macron succumbed to 
public pressure and cancelled the fuel tax that had been the final straw for so many 
protestors. A few months later, he embarked on the “grand débat,” a nationwide tour 
consisting of a series of town halls to enable direct communication between Macron and 
the French people. Macron’s concessions and nationwide tour reflect the Gaullist-design 
of high power concentration in the presidency and the fact that he is less accountable to 
parliament, allowing him to make policy changes, such as raising the minimum wage, on 
the spot.  
The Gilets Jaunes’ successes were owed to, not in spite of, their anti-system 
positions, which united people from across the political spectrum. Additional factors 
were their repertoires of contention, including the potent combination of local junction 
blocking and weekly urban demonstrations, which offered accessibility for different 
populations, heightened a sense of solidarity and social rewards, maximized the 
movement’s visibility, and contributed to its durability.  
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The Gilets Jaunes, initially empowered by the political diversity of their 
protestors, ultimately found their ideological vagueness and resistance to 
institutionalization to be a significant limitation. The movement’s ongoing refusal to form 
coalitions with unions or to cooperate with political parties, even as some members have 
begun to run for local office, condemned the Gilets Jaunes to political irrelevance on a 
national scale. Though highly political, they have run out of avenues through which to 
achieve their objectives because they have condemned them all.  
Despite a gradual weakening on the national political scale, accelerated by the 
outbreak of COVID-19, it is important to remember that they did succeed in resolving the 
“final straws” that sparked demonstrations in the first place: the carbon tax was 
suspended and government aid for working class was increased. However, in terms of 
meeting their demands and resolving overarching themes of economic and social 
inequality, the movement was overall ineffective. This is a typical outcome for policy-
driven, pressure group-type movements: they have issues, not broader institutional goals. 
Once they achieve their policy demands, they demobilize58. 
 This realization seems to have dawned upon current Gilets Jaunes protestors, 
whose institutional resistance has softened in recent months. The December 5, 2019 
protest was reminiscent of a traditional French grève: it was peaceful, diverse and 
featured the heavy presence of labor unions, whose organized security apparatus 
prevented casseurs or violent demonstrators from joining. This mobilization represented a 
stark departure from earlier acts, showing the extent to which the movement has evolved.  
 
58 Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities. Comparative 
Political Studies, 33(6–7), 845–879. 
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In the face of dwindling numbers and the difficulties that come from a lack of 
centralized leadership, Gilet Jaune activism has shifted from the occupation of public 
space to local acts of daily resistance and civic engagement. Upon interviewing Gilets 
Jaunes participants one year after the outbreak of the movement, one reporter observed, 
“the daily lives of yellow vests are organized around discussions and experiments in 
direct democracy, with weekly meetings, conferences and debates. Between tips on what 
to read, discovery of the world of activism, and tutorials into banner making, many 
emphasize that they have never learned as much as they have since they joined the 
movement.”59  
While their forms of activism have changed, their political goals have not. “The 
vest is, above all, a state of mind,” wrote the same reporter. Some Gilets Jaunes are in 
fact running for office now, but many are doing so on citizens tickets and are actively 
building local instruments of direct democracy.60 For many who donned the vest, the 
movement catalyzed a political awakening. Now, those living in peripheral France are 
making daily lifestyle changes as a result. Local symptoms of challenging the political 
party system include going to the market rather than the supermarket, creating a 
communal childcare network, and boycotting globalized services such as Amazon.”61  
Ultimately, the Gilets Jaunes were limited by some of the very qualities that made 
them so unique, including their ideological vagueness, political diversity and resistance to 
both political parties and labor unions. Consequently, the greatest strengths and longest-
lasting implications of the movement are a politicization of the daily lives of many of its 
 
59 “Gilets Jaunes: One Year On, How the ‘Yellow Vest’ Movement Has Changed French Citizens’ Lives.” 
The Conversation. November 16, 2019. 
60 “Gilets Jaunes: One Year On” The Conversation. November 16, 2019. 
61 “Gilets Jaunes: One Year On” The Conversation. November 16, 2019. 
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participants who will not hesitate to mobilize in the future. While they have weakened on 
a national level, they continue to show strength on a local level. After all, localized action 
has always been their specialty.  
What remains to be seen is the impact of the Gilets Jaunes on mainstream political 
parties, who will have to shift their platforms in order to maintain – or regain – 
legitimacy among a vital voting bloc. 
 
Conclusion 
The Gilets Jaunes movement is consequential because it signifies the extent to 
which certain demographics have become disillusioned with electoral politics, no longer 
viewing this system as a viable route toward achieving their political goals. Institutional 
distrust coupled with the misalignment between political parties and the working class are 
two key factors contributing to the mobilization of the Gilets Jaunes which, left 
unresolved as they currently are, will continue to funnel individuals into extra 
institutional, anti-system movements.  
While the movement has weakened and lost many of its original particularities, 
the evolution of the Gilets Jaunes carries significant implications for French democracy. 
First of all, the Gilets Jaunes movement illustrates the undeniable linkages between 
growing economic wealth gaps of industrialized democracies and the weakening 
legitimacy of traditional political institutions. While disillusioned populations in other 
countries have embraced the scapegoating and charismatic candidates of radical political 
parties, the Gilets Jaunes’ distrust of political parties shielded them from the temptations 
of parties such as the Rassemblement National, protecting their vision of political and 
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economic accountability. Their reluctance to turn to political parties can also be 
explained by the design of French political system itself: because political power is so 
concentrated in the presidency, protestors know they need only focus on the president, 
who can make the changes they want to see. This accelerates the obsolescence of the 
traditional party system and empowers extra institutional courses of action that pressure 
the presidency instead of institutional courses of action like running for office or forming 
a political party.  
The most vital takeaway is what this means for the future of French representative 
democracy. The Gilets Jaunes demonstrate that anti-system politics and social 
movements are a necessary phase to shuffle the political deck and to construct grassroots 
institutions of change that will restore the rotting legitimacy of the political system. It is 
likely that as the same structural factors, such as rising economic inequality, resistance to 
political institutionalization, political misalignment and a sense of social abandonment, 
appear in other countries, such as the U.S., similar mobilizations will emerge.  
The philosopher Fredric Jameson wrote that it had become “easier to imagine the 
end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” To succeed, the Gilets Jaunes 
will need to do more than oppose, and create dysfunction within, the current system – 
they must devise a concrete plan to build a France in line with their demands. This may 
require entering political channels and coalition building with labor unions. It may, in 
fact, require a Sixth Republic to disperse the power of the presidency to other 
representative political institutions. It may require acceptance that creating a new system 
sometimes requires working with the current structure. Whether the Gilets Jaunes are 
able to enact political change beyond a localized scale will determine their capacity to 
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create the broad-based change they envision. While unlikely, the temporary unification of 
individuals from across the political spectrum, in opposition to the traditional party 
system, is a legacy unto itself.   
Although storefronts have been repaired and the metro now runs uninterrupted on 
Saturdays, the movement’s legacy remains intact. Though less visible than the 
movement’s iconic uniform, the mobilizing structures created last year are extensive and 
are continually reinforced through expansive networks established among a previously 
divided and powerless segment of the French people. Though the broader implications of 
a politicized French periphery remain to be seen (and will be revealed based on the shifts 
made by mainstream party platforms) the message has been communicated to Macron 
and the French government with unmistakable clarity: tread carefully, for accountability 
exists where it did not before.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Bibliography 
 
Adam Gopnik. “The Yellow Vests and Why There Are So Many Street Protests in  
France.” The New Yorker, December 6, 2018. 
 
Bernard Sananes, Laurence Bedeau, Thomas Vitiello. “Les ‘Gilets Jaunes’: La Partie  
Emergée de la Crise Sociale Française?” Institut Montaigne. 2019. 
 
Bock, Pauline. “A Year On, the Gilets Jaunes Have lost 24 Eyes and Five Hands – and  
Made a Deep Mark on French Society.” New Statesman America. November 21, 
2019.  
Boyer, Pierre, et al. “Les Déterminants De La Mobilisation Des ‘Gilets Jaunes.’” Centers 
of Research in Economics and Statistics, no. 6, 26 July 2019, pp. 1–33.  
Capoccia, Giovanni. “Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment.” Journal of  
Theoretical Politics 14, no. 1 (2002): 9-13. 
 
Carlos Maravall-Rodriguez and Anna Chiara Küffel. “A Comparative View of Motor  
Vehicle Production in France.” European Commission. December 2018. 
 
Chamorel, Patrick. “Macron Versus the Yellow Vests.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4  
(2019): 48-62. Doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0068 
 
“Charte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Facebook, www.facebook.com/Charte-des-gilets-jaunes- 
756772671347085/. 
 
Chayma Drira and Henry Shah, “When Policing Becomes Political: Lessons from  
France’s Gilets Jaunes.” Open Democracy. July 30, 2019. 
 
Christopher Caldwell. “The People’s Emergency.” The New Republic. April 22, 2019.  
 
Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, Simon Rabaté, Muriel Roger. “Workers’ Employment  
Rates and Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Implicit Labor Taxation,” The 
National Bureau of Economic Research, no. 25733. April 2019. 
 
Didier Blanchet, Louis-Paul Pele. “Social Security and Retirement in France,” University  
of Chicago Press. April 1999. 
 
Earl, Jennifer. “Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control”  
Annual Review of Sociology 37: 261–284. 2011. 
 
Earl, Jennifer. "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement  
Repression." Sociological Theory 21, no. 1 (2003): 44-68.  
 
European Road Safety Observatory. “European Commission Vehicle Safety 2018.” 2018.  
 40 
Fillieule, Olivier, and Fabien Jobard. "The Policing of Protest in France: Toward a Model  
of Protest Policing." In Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in 
Western Democracies, edited by Porta Donatella Della and Reiter Herbert, by 
Marx Gary T., 70-90. University of Minnesota Press. 1998.  
 
Royall, Frédéric, “The Gilets Jaunes Protests: Mobilisation Without Third-Party  
Support,” Modern & Contemporary 
France, DOI: 10.1080/09639489.2019.1676217 
 
“Gilets Jaunes: A Pioneering Study of the ‘Low Earners’ Revolt.” Verso Books.  
December 14, 2018.  
 
“Gilets Jaunes: One Year On, How the ‘Yellow Vest’ Movement Has Changed French  
Citizens’ Lives.” The Conversation. November 16, 2019. 
 
Giuseppe Ieraci (1992) Centre parties and anti‐system oppositions in polarised  
systems, West European Politics, 15:2, 17-34, DOI: 10.1080/01402389208424904 
 
“Hervé Le Bras a Dessiné La Carte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Youtube, December 7, 2018. 
 
Ingrid Melander, “French Pensioners Tell Macron to Stop Squeezing Their  
Finances,” Reuters, March 15, 2018.  
 
James McAuley. “Do France’s ‘Yellow Vests’ Have a Future as a Political Party? Some  
Hope so.” The Washington Post. WP Company, January 26, 2019. 
 
Joe Hayns, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Unions: A Convergence Over What?” Notes From  
Below, December 18, 2018. 
 
Ketcham, Christopher. “A Play with No End: What the Gilets Jaunes Really Want.”  
Harper’s Magazine. December 12, 2019. https://harpers.org/archive/2019/08/a-
play-with-no-end-gilets-jaunes/ 
 
Kim Willsher. “‘Abandoned’ French Working Class Ready to Punish Left’s Neglect by  
Voting for Far Right.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, March 21, 
2015. 
 
Kim Willsher. “Injured Gilets Jaunes Protest in Paris Against Police Violence.” The  
Guardian. June 2, 2019.  
 
Kim Willsher. “Macron Scraps Fuel Tax Rise in Face of Gilets Jaunes Protests.” The  
Guardian. December 5, 2018.  
 
Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic  
Polities. Comparative Political Studies, 33(6–7), 845-879.   
 
 
 41 
Korpi, Walter. "Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation." The American Political  
Science Review 68, no. 4 (1974): 1569-578. doi:10.2307/1959942. 
 
Lucy Williamson. “Gilets Jaunes: How Much Anti-Semitism is Beneath the Yellow  
Vests?” BBC News. February 19, 2019.  
 
“Macron Recommits to Fuel Tax Amid Rising Protests.” The Wall Street Journal.  
November 27, 2018.  
 
Melissa Bell, “Gilets Jaunes Movement Sprang From Nowhere to Stun France. One Year  
on, It’s in Desperate Search of a Direction.” CNN. November 16, 2019. 
 
Michel Rose, “French Mood Far From Revolutionary Despite Lingering May ’68  
Spirit,” Reuters, April 13, 2018.  
 
Michel Rose and Luke Baker. “No Leader, Lots of Anger: Can France’s ‘Yellow Vests’  
Become a Political Force?” Reuters, December 6, 2018. 
 
Moullot, Pauline. “Hausse du Prix de l’essence: Qui est à l’origine.du Mouvement du 17  
Novembre?” Libération. October 26, 2018.  
 
Patrick Liddiard, “The Trouble with Political Parties and the Rise of the Yellow Vests.”  
The Wilson Center. March 5, 2019. 
 
Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux. “Politicization of the Electorate in France and  
the United States.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1, 1962, pp. 1–23.   
 
Pierre Briançon. “France’s Two Big Parties Face Long-Term Decline. POLITICO,  
April 21, 2017. 
 
“Priscillia Ludosky, L’auteure de la Pétition sur les Prix du Carburant Répond à  
Emmanuel Macron.” Europe1. December 26, 2018.  
 
Rubin, Alissa J. “France’s Yellow Vest Protests: The Movement That Has Put Paris on  
Edge.” The New York Times. December 3, 2018.  
 
Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Unthinkable Democracy: Political Change  
in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” p. 11 in Parties without Partisans: Political 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Russel J. Dalton and Martin P. 
Wattenberg, eds, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Stathis Kouvélakis and Pascale Arnaud. “Paroles De Rond-Point. Entretiens Avec Les  
Gilets Jaunes De Troyes.” CONTRETEMPS, April 15, 2019. 
 
Useem, Bert. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing  
Movement." American Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 357-69. 
 42 
 
“Yellow Fever: The ‘Gilets Jaunes’ and the Mainstream Media.” Al Jazeera. April 27,  
2019. 
